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Abstract
In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many opportuni-
ties to act within a short interval of time. The agents in such situations can often
coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too
much time. An equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to han-
dle mistakes made by players. In this paper, we present a new solution concept for
inﬁnite-horizon dynamic games, which is appropriate for such situations: a sequen-
tial normal-form correlated approximate equilibrium. Under additional assumptions,
we show that every such game admits this kind of equilibrium.
Subject classiﬁcations: games/group decisions: stochastic. ﬁnancial institutions:
trading.
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1 Introduction
In the modern world there are many situations in which agents have numerous op-
portunities to act within a short interval of time, such as on-line auctions and trade in
stock exchanges, and in these situations diﬀerent agents often have similar but not iden-
tical goals. Such is the case when the agents work in the same ﬁnancial institution and
can coordinate their actions in order to maximize the institution's proﬁt as well as the
contribution of each agent to this proﬁt. In this paper we present a game theoretic model
for such interactions, and we propose a new solution concept for these games, that is suit-
able for situations where players' utilities have a shared component as well as individual
components.
To motivate the study, consider the following situation. Each month the Bureau of La-
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bor Statistics publishes a news release on the U.S. employment situation (ES). This news
release is announced in the middle of the trading day in the European stock markets (on
the ﬁrst Friday of each month at 13:30 London time). The ES announcement has a strong
impact on these markets (see Nikkinen et al., 2006 and the references within). Empirical
studies (see for example, Christie-David, Chaudhry and Khan, 2002) show that a few tens
of minutes elapse before ﬁnancial instruments adjust to such announcements. This gap of
time (the adjustment period) may provide an opportunity for substantial proﬁt to be
made by quick trading (news-playing). Consider the strategic interaction between a few
traders in a ﬁnancial institution who coordinate in advance their actions in the adjustment
period. Each trader can make buy and sell orders for some ﬁnancial instruments that he
is responsible for. The traders share a common objective - maximizing the proﬁt of the
institution. In addition to this, each trader also has a private objective - maximizing the
proﬁt that is made in ﬁnancial instruments that he is responsible for (which inﬂuences his
bonuses and prestige). The traders can freely communicate before the ES announcement,
but communication during the adjustment period is costly: each moment that is spent on
communication may slow down the traders and limit their potential proﬁts.
The family of strategic interactions that we study has the following properties: (1)
the interaction lasts a relatively short time but agents have many instances to act; (2)
diﬀerent agents share similar, though not identical, goals; (3) each agent chooses his
action autonomously; (4) agents can freely communicate before the game starts, but
communication during play is costly or not feasible; (5) agents may occasionally make
mistakes and not execute the actions they had planned to take. Three natural questions
arise when modeling such strategic interactions: (1) Which kind of game should be used?
(2) Which solution concept should be chosen? (3) Does a solution exist, and can we ﬁnd
one?
We begin by dealing with the ﬁrst question. As each agent chooses his actions au-
tonomously, we model this interaction as a noncooperative game (and not as a coalitional
game; see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Section IV, for discussing these two model-
ing approaches). Next we discuss the length of the game. The interaction is relatively
short in absolute terms. Nevertheless, the agents have many opportunities to act (in the
leading example, trade orders can be made in each fraction of a second). In addition,
the point in time where the game ends may not be known to the players in real-time.
Thus, it seems appropriate to model this situation as a stochastic (dynamic) game with
an inﬁnite-horizon, rather then modeling it as a game with a ﬁxed ﬁnite large number of
stages. See Rubinstein (1991) and Aumann and Maschler (1995, pages 131-137) for dis-
cussions why even short strategic interactions may be better analyzed as inﬁnite-horizon
games. Inﬁnite horizon games have been used in a wide range of applications, such as:
bargaining (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1988), inventory control system (Bouakiz and So-
bel, 1992), oligopolistic competition (Bernstein and Federgrauen, 2004), and supply chain
relationships (Taylor and Plambeck, 2007).
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The issue raised in the second question - which solution concept is appropriate - has
several aspects. First, we discuss how each agent evaluates payoﬀs at diﬀerent stages of
the inﬁnite-horizon game. As the interaction is short in absolute time, it is natural to
assume that payoﬀs are evaluated without discounting. Because, in undiscounted games,
payoﬀs that are obtained in the ﬁrst T stages do not aﬀect the total payoﬀ, for every T ;
yet the interaction in our example is ﬁnite, the solution concept should satisfy uniformity:
it should be an approximate equilibrium in any long enough ﬁnite-horizon game. See
Aumann and Maschler (1995, pages 138-142) for arguments in favor of this notion.
The agents in the family of games that we study, can freely communicate before
the game starts, and coordinate their strategies. Aumann (1974) deﬁned normal-form
correlated equilibrium in a ﬁnite game as a Nash equilibrium in an extended game that
includes a correlation device, which sends a private signal to each player before the start
of play. The strategy of each player can then depend on the private signal that he received.
Forges (1986) extended this notion to dynamic games. Under relatively mild conditions,
pre-play non-binding communication among the players can implement a normal-form
correlated equilibrium (see, e.g., Ben-Porath, 1998), and thus this solution concept is
natural in our setup. Forges (1986) also presented the alternative notion of extensive-
form correlated equilibrium, which requires communication at each stage of the game.
This alternative notion is less appropriate to our family of games, because communication
during play is costly or not feasible.
As players may make mistakes, or forget what they were supposed to do in the equilib-
rium, the behavior of the players should also be rational oﬀ the equilibrium path. That is,
players should also use their best response after one player makes a mistake and deviates
from the equilibrium strategy proﬁle. This is satisﬁed by requiring the equilibrium to be
sequential (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
The above reasoning limits the plausible outcomes of the game to the set of sequential
normal-form correlated equilibria. See Myerson (1986a, 1986b) and Dhilon and Mertens
(1996) who study related notions. As inﬁnite undiscounted games may only admit ap-
proximate equilibria, we deﬁne a sequential normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium, as
a strategy proﬁle where with probability at least 1 − δ, no player can earn more than 
by deviating at any stage of the game and after any history of play (as formally deﬁned
in Section 2).
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the presentation of a new solution concept for
undiscounted dynamic games: a sequential uniform normal-form correlated approximate
equilibrium.
We now deal with the third question: proving the existence of this equilibrium. In this
paper we prove existence under the simplifying assumption that, throughout the game,
the agents have symmetric information. This assumption is reasonable in many situations.
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For example, in the leading example, each trader can electronically access the data on
all the prices of the diﬀerent markets. Although in reality each trader may actually focus
only on the information that is more relevant for the ﬁnancial instruments that he is
responsible for, he may obtain the relevant information of other players when necessary.
A second simplifying assumption is that each player has a ﬁnite number of actions.
In the leading example, each trader has a ﬁnite set of ﬁnancial instruments that he is
responsible for, and for each such instrument he chooses a time to buy or a time to sell.
Thus, it can be assumed that a trader's strategy is a vector of buy and sell times, one for
each ﬁnancial instrument that he is responsible for.
The model we study also applies to situations of a diﬀerent nature, for example:
• Several countries plan to ally in a war against another country. The allying countries
share a common objective - maximizing their military success against the common en-
emy. In addition, each country has private objectives, such as maximizing the territories
and resources it occupies during the war, and minimizing its losses. This situation has
similar properties to the leading example: (1) The war is relatively short in absolute
time (a modern war typically lasts a couple of weeks), but it consists of an unknown
large number of stages. (2) The leaders of each country can communicate and coordinate
their future actions before the war begins. On the other hand, secure communication
and coordination during the war may be costly and noisy. (3) Finally, usually only a
few of the battleﬁeld actions of each country are crucial to the outcome of the war (such
as the timing of the main military attack).
• A few male animals compete over the relative positions they shall occupy in the so-
cial hierarchy or pack order. This competition is often settled by a war of attrition
(Maynard Smith, 1974). In most cases, the animals use ritualized ﬁghting and do not
seriously injure their opponents. The winner is the contestant who continues the war for
the longest time. Excessive persistence has the disadvantage of waste of time and energy
in the contest. This situation also shares similar properties with the leading example:
(1) The war of attrition is short in absolute time (usually a few hours or days), but
consists of an unknown large number of stages. (2) Shmida and Peleg (1997) discuss
how a normal-form correlation device can be induced in biological setups by phenotypic
conditional behavior. (3) Finally, each animal in the war of attrition acts only once, by
choosing when to quit the contest.
Under the assumptions discussed earlier, all these strategic interactions are modeled as
follows. There is an unknown state variable on which players receive symmetric partial
information during play. For each player i (from a ﬁnite set of players), there is a ﬁnite
number, Ti, that limits the number of actions he may take during the game. At stage 1
all the players are active. At every stage n, each active player declares, independently of
the others, whether he takes one of a ﬁnite number of actions or does nothing. A player
who acted Ti times, becomes passive for the rest of the game and must do nothing in
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all subsequent stages. The payoﬀ of a player depends on the history of actions and on
the state variable. By induction one can show that the problem of equilibrium existence
reduces to the case when Ti = 1 for every player i. Moreover, one can show that the
problem further reduces to the case where each player has a single stopping action, and
that the game ends as soon as any player stops (see Section 5).
Such a game is called a (discrete undiscounted) stopping game. The literature includes
two variants for the deﬁnition of stopping games. Some papers (see, e.g., Shmaya and
Solan, 2004) assume that the game ends as soon as any player stops. Other papers (see,
e.g., Ramsey, 2007) assume that after one player stops, the other players continue to play.
In this paper, we formally follow the ﬁrst deﬁnition, and we show in Section 5 how our
result can be applied to the second variant as well.
Stopping games were introduced by Dynkin (1969), and later used in several models
in economics, management science, political science and biology, such as research and
development (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Mamer, 1987), struggle of survival
among ﬁrms in a declining market (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986), auctions (see
e.g., Krishna and Morgan, 1997), lobbying (see e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 2001), conﬂict
among animals (see e.g., Nalebuﬀ and Riley, 1985), and duels (see, e.g., Karlin, 1959).
Stopping games where players are allowed to stop more than once (Ti > 1) are investigated,
among others, in Szajowski (2002), Yasuda and Szajowski (2002) and Laraki and Solan
(2005).
Much work has been devoted to the study of undiscounted two-player stopping games.
This problem, when the payoﬀs have a special structure, was studied by Neveu (1975),
Mamer (1987), Morimoto (1986), Ohtsubo (1991), Nowak and Szajowski (1999), Rosen-
berg, Solan and Vieille (2001), Neumann, Ramsey and Szajowski (2002), and Shmaya and
Solan (2004), among others. Those authors provided various suﬃcient conditions under
which (Nash) approximate equilibria exist.
Undiscounted multi-player stopping games have mostly been modeled in the existing
literature as cooperative (coalitional) games. Assaf and Samuel-Cahn (1998a, 1998b) and
Glickman (2004) have studied a model where players can only stop by an unanimous
decision, and that the group's stopping rule maximizes a speciﬁc function of the expected
payoﬀ of each player. Other papers have investigated the use of cooperative solution
concepts in this setup: the core (Ohtsubo, 1996), Pareto-optima (Ohtsubo, 1995, 1998)
and Shapley value (Ramsey and Cierpial, 2009). Another model, which is more related
to our noncooperative framework, is a stopping game with a voting procedure. In such
games, each player votes at each stage whether or not he wishes to stop the game, and
there is some monotonic rule (for example, majority rule) that determines if the set of
players who voted to terminate, has the power to stop the game. (Section 5 discusses an
extension of our model that includes a voting procedure.) This model has been studied,
among others, in Kurano, Yasuda and Nakagami (1980), Yasuda, Nakagami and Kurano
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(1982), Szajowski and Yasuda (1997), and Ferguson (2002). All these papers make a
simplifying assumption, which is not made in our model, that the payoﬀs to the players
only depend on the stage in which the game stops, but not on the identity of the stopping
players. In contrast with the two-player case, there is no existence result for approximate
equilibria in multi-player stopping games without this assumption.
Our main result states that for every δ,  > 0, a multi-player stopping game admits
a sequential uniform normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium. We further show that the
equilibrium's correlation device has three appealing properties: (1) it is canonical - each
signal is equivalent to a strategy; (2) it does not depend on the speciﬁc parameters of
the game; and (3) it satisﬁes approximate constant expectation - the expected payoﬀ of
each player is approximately independent of the pre-play communication. In Section A
we discuss the rationale and the basic properties of this notion, which generalizes Sorin
(1998)'s notion of distribution equilibrium.
The proof relies on a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem (Shmaya and Solan,
2004) that reduces the problem to that of studying the properties of correlated -equilibria
in multi-player absorbing games (stochastic games with a single non-absorbing state). The
study uses the result of Solan and Vohra (2002) that any multi-player absorbing game
admits a correlated -equilibrium.
Another interesting question is that of how to characterize the properties of the set
of equilibrium payoﬀs and to develop methods for selecting a speciﬁc equilibrium with
corresponding payoﬀ that satisﬁes some appealing properties, like Pareto-eﬃciency, max-
imizing the sum of payoﬀs (utilitarianism, eﬃciency), or maximizing the minimal payoﬀ
(egalitarianism). Such methods are important for the use of the model in applications,
such as the leading example. Our proof is not constructive, and this question, with gen-
eral payoﬀ structure, remains open for future research. The reader is referred to Ramsey
and Szajowski (2008), and the references therein, who study this problem in a two-player
stopping game.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the result. A sketch
of the proof appears in Section 3. Section 4 contains the proof. In Section 5 we discuss
how to apply our result, which formally deals only with simple stopping games, to more
general situations, such as the leading example. Appendix A discusses the rationale of
the notion of constant-expectation correlated equilibrium, which may be of independent
interest.
2 Model and Main Result
In the introduction, we presented an example of the strategic interaction among traders
when some macroeconomic news is published (the leading example), and discussed how
6
to model it by a stopping game. In this section we present the formal deﬁnitions, and
state our main result.
A stopping game is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A stopping game is a 6-tuple G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) where:
• I is a ﬁnite set of players;
• (Ω,A, p) is a probability space;
• F = (Fn)n≥0 is a ﬁltration over (Ω,A, p);
• R = (Rn)n≥0 is an F -adapted R|I|·(2
|I|−1)-valued process. The coordinates of matrix Rn
are denoted by RiS,nwhere i ∈ I and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N .
A stopping game is played as follows. At each stage n, each player is informed which
elements of Fn include ω (the state of the world), and declares, independently of the
others, whether he stops or continues. If all players continue, the game continues to the
next stage. If at least one player stops, say a set of players S ⊆ I, the game terminates,
and the payoﬀ to player i is RiS,n. If no player ever stops, the payoﬀ to everyone is zero.
Remark 2 According to Deﬁnition 1, a stopping game ends as soon as one of the play-
ers stops. As discussed earlier, the literature also includes another deﬁnition (see, e.g.,
Ramsey, 2007), according to which, when one player stops, the others continue to play. In
Section 5 we discuss how to apply our result to the alternative deﬁnition, and to a more
complicated strategic interaction, as in the leading example, in which players have more
than one action, and may act more than once during the game.
We model the pre-play communication possibilities of the players by a correlation device:
Deﬁnition 3 A (normal-form) correlation device is a pair D = (M,µ): (1)M = (M i)i∈I ,
where M i is a ﬁnite space of signals the device can send player i, and (2) µ ∈ 4 (M) is
the probability distribution according to which the device sends the signals to the players
before the stopping game starts.
As discussed earlier, cheap talk communication among the players can be used to mimic a
correlation device. Speciﬁcally, when there are at least three players, under mild conditions
on the set of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, any correlated equilibrium can be implemented as
a sequential equilibrium of an extended game with pre-play cheap talk (Ben-Porath, 1998;
see also Heller, 2010a for an implementation that is resistant to coalitional deviations).
This is also true for two players, under additional cryptographic assumptions (Urbano
and Vila, 2002).
Throughout the paper we denote the signal proﬁle that the players receive from the
correlation device by m. Given a normal-form correlation device D, we deﬁne an extended
game G (D). The game G (D) is played exactly as G, except that, at the outset of the
game, a signal proﬁle m = (mi)i∈I is drawn according to µ, and each player i is privately
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informed of mi. Then, each player may base his strategy on the signal he received.
As mentioned earlier, Shmida and Peleg (1997, Section 5) discuss how a normal-
form correlation device can be induced in nature by phenotypic conditional behavior.
Speciﬁcally, they present an example of butterﬂies who compete for sunspot clearings in
a forest in order to fertilize females. When two butterﬂies meet in a sunspot, they engage
in a war of attrition. The length of time each butterﬂy was in the spot prior to ﬁghting is
used as a normal-form correlation device: a senior butterﬂy stays for a long time in the
war, while a new butterﬂy gives up quickly.
For simplicity of notation, let the singleton set {i} be denoted as i, and let −i = I\ {i}
denote the set of all players besides player i. A (behavior) strategy for player i in G (D)
is an F -adapted process xi = (xin)n≥0, where xin : (Ω×M i) → [0, 1]. The interpretation
is that xin (ω,m
i) is the probability by which player i stops at stage n when he received
a signal mi.
Let θ be the ﬁrst stage in which at least one player stops, and let θ =∞ if no player ever
stops. If θ <∞ let Sθ ⊆ I be the set of players who stop at stage θ. The expected payoﬀ
of player i under the strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I is given by γ
i (x) = Ex
(
1θ<∞ ·RiSθ ,θ
)
where the expectation Ex is with respect to (w.r.t.) the distribution Px over plays induced
by x. Given an event E ⊆ Ω and a set of signal proﬁles M ′ ⊆M , let γi (x|E,M ′) be the
expected payoﬀ of player i conditioned on E and on the signal proﬁle being in M ′. Given
m′ ∈M ′, let γi (x|E,M ′,m′i) denote the expected payoﬀ of player i conditioned on E, on
the signal proﬁle being in M ′, and on the signal of player i being equal to m′i.
The strategy xi is an -best reply for player i when all his opponents follow x−i if
for every strategy yi of player i: γi (x) ≥ γi (x−i, yi) − . Similarly, xi is -best reply
conditioned on E and M ′ if γi (x |E ,M ′) ≥ γi (x−i , y i |E ,M ′)− .
Given ω ∈ Ω, let Hn (ω) ⊆ Fn be the collection of all events in Fn that include
ω: Hn (ω) = {Fn ∈ Fn|ω ∈ Fn}. Hn (ω) denotes the public history of play up to stage
n, when the true state is ω. Let Hn be the collection of all such histories of length n:
Hn = {Hn (ω) |ω ∈ Ω}, and letH = ⋃n=1..∞Hn be the set of all histories. Let G(Hn,D,m)
be the induced stopping game that begins at stage n, when each player i has received the
private signal mi ∈M i, and the public history is Hn ∈ Hn. For simplicity of notation, we
use the same notation for a strategy proﬁle in G (D) and for the induced strategy proﬁle
in G(Hn,D,m).
As discussed earlier, we require players to also be rational oﬀ the equilibrium path.
This is satisﬁed by requiring the equilibrium to be sequential (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
In what follows we adapt the deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium in a ﬁnite extensive-form
game, to our framework of inﬁnite extended stopping games. The adaptation includes two
parts: (1) Simplifying the belief system because the only source for imperfect information
on past events is due to the private signals the players received from the correlation device
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before the game starts. (2) Deﬁning an approximate variation of sequential equilibrium
due to the inﬁniteness of stopping games. Observe that we adopt the notation of Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994, Chapters 6 and 12), and do not consider simultaneous moves as a
source of imperfect information.
We begin by deﬁning a belief system in an extended stopping game G (D) as a proﬁle
of functions (qi)i∈I . Each function q
i : H×M i →4 (M−i) assigns a distribution over the
signals of the other players. The distribution is interpreted as follows: after receiving a
signal mi and observing a public history H, player i assigns probability qi (H,mi) (m−i)
to the signal proﬁle of the other players being m−i. Given M ′ ⊆ M , let qi (H,mi|M ′) be
the belief of player i over the signal proﬁle, conditional on the signal proﬁle being in M ′.
An assessment in an extended stopping gameG (D) is a pair (x, q) where x is a strategy
proﬁle and q is a belief system. An assessment is -sequentially rational, conditioned on
an event E and on M ′, if every player -best replies whenever the signal proﬁle is in M ′
and the state is in E. When  = 0 it coincides with the standard deﬁnition of sequential
rationality (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Formally:
Deﬁnition 4 Let G (D) be an extended stopping game (where D = (M,µ)),  ≥ 0,
M ′ ⊆M , and E ⊆ Ω. An assessment (x, q) is -sequentially rational in G (D) conditioned
on E and M ′, if for every i ∈ I, ω ∈ E, n ∈ N, and signal proﬁle m ∈M ′, xi is an -best
reply for player i conditioned on E and on M ′ in the induced game G(Hn (ω) ,D,m),
when his opponents play x−i, and his beliefs over the signal proﬁle are qi (Hn (ω) ,mi|M ′).
A strategy proﬁle is completely mixed if each player assigns positive probability to every
action (stop or continue) after every history. An assessment (x, q) is consistent if it is the
limit of a sequence of assessments ((xn, qn))
∞
n=1 with the following properties: (1) each
strategy proﬁle xn is completely mixed; (2) each belief system qn is derived from xn using
Bayes' rule. An assessment is a sequential -equilibrium conditioned on E and M ′, if it is
-sequentially rational (conditioned on E and M ′) and consistent. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5 Let G (D) be an extended stopping game (where D = (M,µ)),  ≥ 0,
M ′ ⊆M , and E ⊆ Ω. An assessment (x, q) is sequential -equilibrium inG (D) conditioned
on E andM ′, if it is both -sequentially rational conditioned on E andM ′ and consistent.
Deﬁnition 5 extends the standard deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium. That is, when  = 0,
M = M ′ and E = Ω, it is equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
An assessment is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium if it is a sequential -equilibrium con-
ditioned on E and M ′, where E and M ′ have probabilities of at least 1− δ. Formally:
Deﬁnition 6 Let G (D) be an extended stopping game and let δ,  ≥ 0. An assessment
(x, q) is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium of G (D) if there exists an event E ⊆ Ω and a set
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of signal proﬁles M ′ ⊆ M , such that p(E) ≥ 1− δ, µ(M ′) ≥ 1− δ, and x is a sequential
-equilibrium of G (D) conditioned on E and M ′.
Abusing notation, we say that a strategy proﬁle x is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium ofG (D)
if there is a belief system q, such that the assessment (x, q) is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium
in G (D). Observe that when the correlation device is trivial (|M | = 1) sequentiality
is equivalent to subgame perfectness (Selten, 1965, 1975). Speciﬁcally, when |M | = 1,
the deﬁnition of a (δ, )-sequential equilibrium is equivalent to the deﬁnition of a (δ, )-
subgame-perfect equilibrium in Mashiah-Yaakovi (2009). Without the limitation |M | = 1,
every (δ, )-sequential equilibrium is a (δ, )-subgame-perfect equilibrium, but the converse
is not true.
We now deﬁne a sequential correlated (δ, )-equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 7 Let G be a stopping game and let δ,  > 0. A sequential correlated (δ, )-
equilibrium is a pair (D, x), where D is a correlation device and x is a sequential (δ, )-
equilibrium in G (D).
We end this subsection by deﬁning another appealing property of a correlation device:
canonicality. A correlation device D = (M,µ) is canonical if each signal is equivalent to
a strategy.
Deﬁnition 8 Let G be a stopping game. A correlation device D = (M,µ) is canonical
given the strategy proﬁle x in G (D) if for each player i there is an injection between M i
and his set of strategies in G. That is x (mi) 6= x (m′i) for each mi 6= m′i.
The standard deﬁnition of a canonical correlation device for ﬁnite games (Forges, 1986)
is that the set of signals is equal to the set of strategy proﬁles. Deﬁnition 8 is diﬀerent
because the set of signals is ﬁnite, while the set of strategies is inﬁnite.
The main result of this paper is the existence of a sequential normal-form corre-
lated approximate equilibrium. In order to prove this result, we state and prove a some-
what stronger result - the existence of such an equilibrium that also satisﬁes approximate
constant-expectation (the reasons for this requirement are explained after Lemma 12 in
Subsection 4.1).
Formally, We say that a proﬁle x in G (D) satisﬁes -constant-expectation conditioned
on E and M ′, if whenever the state is in E ⊆ Ω and the signal proﬁle is in M ′, the
expected payoﬀ of each player changes by at most  when he obtains his signal. We say
that x satisﬁes (δ, )-constant-expectation if this holds for some E andM ′ with probability
at least 1− δ.
Deﬁnition 9 Let G (D) be an extended stopping game (where D = (M,µ)), M ′ ⊆ M
and E ⊆ Ω. The strategy proﬁle x in G(D) satisﬁes (δ, )-constant-expectation (where
, δ ≥ 0) if there is a set M ′ ⊆M and an event E such that µ(M ′) ≥ 1− δ, p(E) ≥ 1− δ,
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for every i ∈ I and m′ ∈M ′: |γi(x|E,M ′,m′i)− γi(x|E,M ′)| ≤ .
The deﬁnition of an approximate constant-expectation correlated equilibrium general-
izes Sorin (1998)'s deﬁnition of distribution equilibrium for ﬁnite normal-form games. In
Appendix A we discuss the rationale for this notion and provide some examples.
We conclude by formally stating our main result:
Theorem 10 Let G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) be a multi-player stopping game with integrable
payoﬀs (supn∈(N
⋃
∞) ‖Rn‖∞ ∈ L1(p)). Then for every δ,  > 0, G has a sequential (δ, )-
constant-expectation normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium with a canonical correla-
tion device. Moreover, the correlation device only depends on the number of players and
, and is independent of the payoﬀ process.
Remark 11 The (δ, )-equilibrium that we construct is uniform in a strong sense: it is
a (δ, 2)-equilibrium in every ﬁnite n-stage game, provided that n is suﬃciently large.
This can be seen by the construction itself (Proposition 17) or by applying a general
observation made by Solan and Vieille (2001).
The proof of the main result and the main properties of the correlation device are sketched
in the following section. A formal proof is presented in Section 4.
3 Sketch of the Proof
We begin our sketch by focusing on a simple kind of stopping games - periodic stopping
games on ﬁnite trees. These are stopping games with a ﬁnite ﬁltration, where after a ﬁnite
number of stages, if not stopped earlier, the game restarts at the ﬁrst stage. Such games
are a special kind of absorbing games (stochastic games with a single non-absorbing state,
see Sorin, 2002, 5.5). Solan and Vohra (2002) studied absorbing games and proved that
they admit a correlated -equilibrium. Adapting their result to our framework implies that
every periodic stopping game has either (1) a stationary equilibrium; or (2) a set of nodes
in the tree (v˜i)i∈I , a function that assigns to each player i another player as his punisher,
a distribution ζ over the players which chooses a stopper, and a procedure that asks each
player i to stop at a random time in which node v˜i is reached, under the constraints that
the stopper is asked to stop ﬁrst and that his punisher is asked to stop second; this
procedure induces a correlated equilibrium (each player has an incentive to stop only
when being asked to). We strengthen their result if case (1) holds: by perturbing the
game to continue with positive probability at each stage we show that there is a stationary
sequential -equilibrium, and we adapt the methods of Shmaya and Solan (2004, Section
6) to extend it to periodic games with inﬁnite ﬁltrations.
The next step in the proof extends the equilibrium existence result to inﬁnite non-
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periodic stopping games by using Shmaya and Solan (2004, Section 4)'s stochastic varia-
tion of Ramsey's Theorem (1930). The theorem implies that for suﬃciently large n, every
induced game that begins at stage n, can be divided into an inﬁnite sequence of periodic
stopping games that either: (a) all admit a stationary equilibrium with approximately the
same equilibrium payoﬀ, or (b) all admit a set of nodes (v˜i)i∈I with approximately the
same payoﬀ matrices (Rv˜i)i∈I , the same function that assigns a punisher for each player,
and approximately the same distribution ζ that satisfy case (2) above. In case (a), we
adapt the method of Shmaya and Solan (2004, Section 7) to concatenate the approximate
Nash equilibrium in each periodic game into an approximate Nash equilibrium in the
original inﬁnite non-periodic game.
In case (b), we construct an approximate normal-form correlated equilibrium as fol-
lows. The correlation device uses the distribution ζ to choose the stopper (say, player
i). Each player j receives a large random number lj, which is interpreted as a recom-
mendation to stop with probability 1- at the lj-th time that the payoﬀ matrix is in an
-neighborhood of Rv˜j . (Players are being asked to stop with probability strictly less than
1 in order to prevent players from being able to deduce that they are oﬀ the equilibrium
path even when other players deviate; this allows the equilibrium to be sequential.) The
distribution according to which the device chooses the numbers (lj)j∈I satisﬁes: 1) the
stopper is asked to stop ﬁrst, 2) his punisher is asked to stop second, and 3) with high
probability, when a player receives his signal, he cannot deduce which player is the stop-
per. These properties imply that following the recommendations is a sequential correlated
approximate equilibrium in the induced game that begins at stage n.
Finally we use the equilibrium in each induced game that begins at stage n to construct
a normal-form sequential correlated approximate equilibrium in the original stopping game
with a universal correlation device that only depends on  and ﬁts every payoﬀ process.
The assumption that the payoﬀs are integrable allows us to approximate the compact
set of distributions over the players by a ﬁnite set (ζk)1≤k≤K . Before the game starts
the device sends each player j a vector of numbers
(
ljk
)
1≤k≤K . If the game reaches stage
n, each player j checks which distribution ζk ﬁts the induced game, and he follows the
recommendation ljk thereafter. Until stage n, players play the sequential Nash equilibrium
of the ﬁnite stopping game that terminates at stage n, if no player stopped earlier, with
a terminal payoﬀ that is equal to the equilibrium payoﬀ in the induced game that begins
at stage n. In the leading example the universality of the device allows the traders to
construct, once and for all, a correlation device that can be used in all future strategic
interactions regardless of the speciﬁc implications of the macroeconomic news that is going
to be released.
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4 Proof
This section includes ﬁve parts. Subsection 4.1 includes some notation that is used
later in the proof, and shows that one can focus on proving equilibrium existence in an
induced game that begins after some bounded stopping time is reached. Subsection 4.2
presents a special form of stopping games - stopping games on ﬁnite trees, and shows that
such games can approximate periodic stopping games with inﬁnite ﬁltrations. Subsection
4.3 adapts the result of Solan and Vohra (2002) and shows that every stopping games on a
ﬁnite tree admits a sequential correlated equilibrium. Subsection 4.4 presents a stochastic
variation of Ramsey's theorem, which is adapted from Solan and Shmaya (2004). Finally,
Subsection 4.5 uses all the previous results to prove that every (inﬁnite and non-periodic)
stopping game admits a sequential correlated equilibrium with the properties required in
Theorem 10.
4.1 Preliminaries
If with probability at least 1 − δ, the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs of two stopping
games G and G˜ is at most , then any sequential (δ, )-equilibrium in G is a sequential
(3δ, 3)-equilibrium in G˜. Hence now ﬁx a stopping game G and assume without loss of
generality (w.l.o.g.) that the payoﬀ process R is uniformly bounded and that its range is
ﬁnite. In fact, we assume that for some K ∈ N, RiS,n ∈
{
0,± 1
K
,± 2
K
, ...,±K
K
}
for every
n ∈ N. LetD = ∏i∈I, ∅6=S⊆I {0,± 1K ,± 2K , ...,±KK} be the set of all possible one-stage payoﬀ
matrices of the stopping game G. Let Rn(ω) be the payoﬀ matrix at stage n.
We now ﬁx , δ > 0. Given any payoﬀ matrix d ∈ D, let Ad ⊆ ∨n∈NFn be the event
that d occurs inﬁnitely often (i.o.): Ad = {ω ∈ Ω|i.o. Rn(ω) = d}, and let Bd,k ⊆ ∨n∈NFn
be the event that d never occurs after stage k : Bd,k = {ω ∈ Ω|∀n ≥ k, Rn(ω) 6= d}. Since
all Ad andBd,k are in
∨
n∈NFn, there existN0 ∈ N and FN0-measurable sets
(
A¯d, B¯d
)
d∈D ∈
FN0 that approximate Ad and Bd,N0 . That is: (1) For each d ∈ D: A¯d
⋂
B¯d = ∅ and(
A¯d
⋃
B¯d
)
= Ω. (2) ∀d ∈ D, p
(
Ad|A¯d
)
≥ 1− δ
3·|D| . (3) ∀d ∈ D, p
(
Bd,N0|B¯d
)
≥ 1− δ
3·|D| .
Let Φ =
⋃
d∈D
({
ω ∈ A¯d|ω /∈ Ad
}⋃{
ω ∈ B¯d|ω /∈ Bd,N0
})
be the event that includes
all the approximation's errors. That is, Φ includes all states where a payoﬀ matrix d
does not repeat inﬁnitely often even though ω ∈ A¯d, and all states where a payoﬀ matrix
d occurs after N0 even though ω ∈ B¯d. Observe that p(Φ) < δ3 . For any H ∈ H let
D (H) =
{
d ∈ D|∃F ∈ H, s.t.F ⊆ A¯d
}
be the set of payoﬀ matrices that repeat inﬁnitely
often after history H (outside Φ). For each player i ∈ I, let αiH = max
(
di{i}|d ∈ D (H)
)
be the maximal payoﬀ a player can get by stopping alone in one of the matrices in D (H).
Given a bounded stopping time τ , let Hτ =
{
Hτ(ω) (ω) |ω ∈ Ω
}
denote the set of all
possible public histories when τ is reached.
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Consider an induced game that begins after some bounded stopping time τ is reached.
The following standard lemma shows that in order to prove Theorem 10, it is enough to
show that each such game has an approximate constant-expectation sequential correlated
equilibrium with a canonical correlation device that depends only on |I| and .
Lemma 12 Let D = (M,µ) a canonical correlation device that depends only on |I| and
, M ′ ⊆ M a set satisfying µ(M ′) > 1 − δ, E ⊆ Ω an event such that p(E) > 1 − δ,
and τ a bounded stopping time. Assume that for every ω ∈ E, m ∈ M ′, and H ∈ Hτ ,
there is a constant-expectation sequential -equilibrium, xH , in G(H,D,m) conditioned on
E and M ′. Then G (D) admits a (δ, )-constant-expectation sequential (δ, )-equilibrium.
This implies thatG admits a sequential (δ, )-constant-expectation normal-form correlated
(δ, )-equilibrium with a canonical device, which depends only on |I| and .
PROOF. It is well known that any ﬁnite-stage game admits a sequential 0-equilibrium.
Since τ is bounded, p(E) ≥ 1− δ and µ(M ′) ≥ 1− δ, the following strategy proﬁle x is a
(δ, )-constant-expectation sequential (δ, )-equilibrium:
• Until stage τ , play a sequential equilibrium, which is trivially a constant-expectation
equilibrium, in the ﬁnite stopping game that terminates at τ , if no player stops before
that stage, with a terminal payoﬀ γi(xH).
• If the game has not terminated by stage τ , from that stage on, play the proﬁle xH in
G(H,D,m). 
Observe that for the concatenated proﬁle x to be a normal-form correlated equilibrium,
it is necessary that each induced game's equilibrium would satisfy constant-expectation.
Otherwise, the signal a player receives before the game starts may change his expected
payoﬀs in the induced games, and this may create proﬁtable deviations from x. For exam-
ple, if a player receives a bad signal that indicates that the posterior expected payoﬀs
in the induced games (G(H,D,m))H∈Hτ are likely to be much lower then the ex-ante
expected payoﬀs, (γi(xH))H∈Hτ , then it might be proﬁtable for him to deviate and stop
at some stage in which his payoﬀ (when stopping alone) is between these two quantiﬁers.
Observe as well that the sequentiality and constant-expectation of each equilibrium in the
induced games imply that x has these two properties.
4.2 Periodic Stopping Games on Finite Trees
Generally, a stopping game is non-periodic, has an inﬁnite length and has an inﬁnite
ﬁltration. We now consider a special kind of stopping game, which is periodic (with ﬁnite
length) and has a ﬁnite ﬁltration. Such a game can be modeled by a game on a ﬁnite tree.
The game starts at the root and is played in stages. Each node in the tree has a matrix
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payoﬀ (in case players stop at that node), and a distribution over its oﬀspring nodes,
which determines the probability that the game would continue to each of these nodes, if
no player stops. Given the current node, and the sequence of nodes already visited, the
players decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to stop or to continue. Let S
be the set of players that decides to stop. If S 6= ∅, the play ends and the terminal payoﬀ
to each player i is determined by the node's payoﬀ matrix. If S = ∅, a new node is chosen
according to the node's distribution over its oﬀspring. The process now repeats itself, with
the oﬀspring node being the current node. When the players reach a leaf, the new current
node is the root. A game on a tree is essentially played in rounds, where each round starts
at the root and ends once it reaches a leaf. Formally:
Deﬁnition 13 A stopping game on a ﬁnite tree (or simply a game on a tree) is a tuple
T =
(
I, V, Vleaf , r, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
, where:
• I is a ﬁnite non-empty set of players;
•
(
V, r, (Cv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
is a tree, V is a nonempty ﬁnite set of nodes, Vleaf ⊆ V is a
nonempty set of leaves, r ∈ V is the root, and for each v ∈ V \Vleaf , Cv ⊆ V \ {r} is a
nonempty set of oﬀspring of v. We denote by V0 = V \Vleaf the set of nodes which are
not leaves;
and for every v ∈ V0:
• pv is a probability distribution over CV ; we assume that ∀v˜ ∈ Cv: pv(v˜) > 0;
• Rv =
(
Riv,S
)
i∈I,∅6=S⊆I ∈ D is the payoﬀ matrix at v if a nonempty set of players S stops
at that node.
Given a bounded stopping time n < σ and history Hn ⊆ Hn, let Gn,σ (Hn) be the induced
stopping game that begins at stage n , when the players are informed of Hn, and the game
restarts at stage n (where a new ω ∈ Hn is randomly chosen), if no player stopped before
reaching stage σ(ω). A simple adaptation of the methods of Shmaya and Solan (2004,
Sections 5-6) shows that Gn,σ (Hn) can be approximated by a game on a tree, Tn,σ (Hn),
such that every -equilibrium in Tn,σ (Hn) is a 3-equilibrium in Gn,σ (Hn). In the following
paragraph we sketch the main idea behind this approximation. The reader is referred to
Shmaya and Solan (2004) for the formal details.
For simplicity of presentation let σ be constant: σ = m > n. All that matters to the
players at stage m, is the payoﬀ matrix at this stage (because if no player stops, the game
restarts at stage n with a new random ω ∈ Hn, which is independent of the information
the players have on the current ω). Thus we can cluster together the Fm-measurable
sets according to their payoﬀ matrices, and have at most |D| leaves in the ﬁnite tree. At
stage m − 1, players care about both the current payoﬀ matrix and the distribution of
the payoﬀ matrices at the next stage. Using a ﬁnite approximation to this distribution
(rounding each probability up to /2m), enables clustering of Fm−1-measurable sets into
a ﬁnite number of vertices as well. Similarly, one can show by a recursive procedure that
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the entire game Gn,σ (Hn) can be approximated by a stopping game on a ﬁnite tree.
Assuming that n > N0 we perturb the game on a tree Tn,σ (Hn) by not allowing players
to stop in any node v¯ with a payoﬀ matrix Rv¯ is in B¯d. That is, in such nodes, players
must continue and the game goes on to one of v¯'s oﬀspring.
4.3 Equivalence of Periodic Games and Absorbing Games
A stopping game on a ﬁnite tree T = Tn,σ (Hn) is equivalent to an absorbing game
(Solan and Vohra, 2002; Sorin, 2002, 5.5), where each round of T corresponds to a single
stage of the absorbing game. As an absorbing game, T has two special properties: (1) it
is a recursive game: the payoﬀ in the non-absorbing state is zero; (2) there is a unique
non-absorbing action proﬁle.
Given a game on a tree T , let gi be the maximal payoﬀ player i can get by stopping
alone. Let v˜i be a node that gives player i his maximal payoﬀ gi. Adapting Proposition
4.10 in Solan and Vohra (2002) to the two special properties gives the following:
Proposition 14 Let T be a game on a ﬁnite tree. One of the following holds:
(1) There is a stationary absorbing sequential -equilibrium x.
(2) There is a stationary non-absorbing sequential equilibrium where all the players
always continue.
(3) There is a distribution ζ ∈ ∆(I) over the players such that:
(a) For each player j ∈ I, Eζ′
(
Rj{i},v˜i
)
=
∑
i∈I ζ (i) · Rj{i},v˜i ≥ gj, where ζ ′ denote
the distribution over payoﬀ vectors
{
R{i},v˜i
}
i∈I that is induced from ζ as follows:
player i is chosen according to ζ, and v˜i is the node deﬁned above. That is, we
require that the expected payoﬀ of each player j from the induced distribution
ζ ′ is as high as his maximal payoﬀ when stopping alone.
(b) Let the players in the support of ζ (ζ (i) > 0) be denoted as the stopping players.
For every stopping player i there exists a player ji 6= i, the punisher of i, such
that: gi ≥ Ri{ji},v˜ji . That is, each stopping player prefers to stop alone at v˜i rather
than having his punisher ji stopping alone at v˜
ji .
These two properties of ζ are used in Subsection 4.5 to construct a correlated equi-
librium with payoﬀs that are induced by ζ ′. The ﬁrst property prevents players from
deviating by stopping when they are not asked to stop, and the second property
prevent players from deviating by continuing when they are asked to stop.
Remark 15 Solan and Vohra (2002) do not guarantee that the stationary absorbing
equilibrium in case (1) is sequential . Speciﬁcally, players may play irrationally after
some player i is supposed to stop with probability 1 according to xi. To prevent this,
we perturb the game T . Let T be a game similar to T , except that when a non-empty
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set of players wishes to stop at some node, there is a probability  that the stopping
request is ignored, and the game continues to the next stage. T is also equivalent to an
absorbing game, and Solan and Vohra (2002)'s proposition can be applied. In T no node
is ever oﬀ the equilibrium path, and thus any Nash equilibrium in T is subgame perfect,
which is equivalent to being sequential, as the correlation device is trivial (as discussed
after Deﬁnition 6). Any such stationary sequential equilibrium in T naturally deﬁnes a
strategy proﬁle in T . One can see that this proﬁle is a stationary sequential -equilibrium
in T .
4.4 A Stochastic Variation of Ramsey's Theorem
Solan and Shmaya (2004) present a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem (Ramsey,
1930), and a method to use it to disassemble an inﬁnite (non-periodic) stopping game into
games on ﬁnite trees with special properties. In this subsection we sketch the main ideas
of this method, while leaving some of the formal details to Appendix B.
Let C be a ﬁnite set of colors. An F -consistent C-valued NT-function (or simply an
NT-function) is a function that attaches a color cn,σ (ω) = cn,σ (Hn (ω)) to every induced
stopping game Gn,σ (Hn (ω)). Given an NT-function and two bounded stopping times
τ1 < τ2, let cτ1,τ2(ω) = cτ1(ω),τ2(ω). Thus cτ1,τ2 is an Fn-measurable random variable.
Shmaya and Solan (2004, Theorem 4.3) proved the following proposition :
Proposition 16 For every ﬁnite set C, every C -valued F-consistent NT -function c, and
every  > 0, there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times 0 < σ1 < σ2 <
σ3 < ... such that: p (cσ1,σ2 = cσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1− .
We now present a somewhat simpliﬁed version of the NT-function that would be used to
prove Theorem 10; the exact function is described in Appendix B.
Let W =
∏
i∈I
{
0,± 1
K
, ...,±K
K
}
be a ﬁnite 1/K-approximation of [−1, 1]|I|. Let C =
{{1, 2, 3} ×W ×W} be a set of colors, where the ﬁrst component denotes which case
of Proposition 14 holds in Tn,σ (Hn (ω)); the second component denotes the approximate
equilibrium payoﬀ, and the third component denotes the payoﬀ of each player when he
stops alone in case 3. That is, cn,σ (ω)=(case, w, g) is deﬁned as follows:
• case = 1 if there is a stationary absorbing equilibrium in Tn,σ (Hn (ω)) (that is, case
(1) of Proposition 14 holds). Otherwise, case = 2 if there is a sequential non-absorbing
equilibrium in Tn,σ (Hn (ω)). Otherwise, case = 3 and then case (3) of Prop. 14 holds.
• w is the equilibrium payoﬀ in cases (1) and (2), and it is the payoﬀ that is induced from
the distribution η′ in case (3): w = Eζ′
(
Rj{i},v˜i
)
=
∑
i∈I ζ (i) ·Rj{i},v˜i (where v˜i is a node
that maximizes player i's reward when stopping alone).
• g is the maximal payoﬀ each player can get by stopping alone in Tn,σ (Hn (ω)) in case
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(3), and it is arbitrarily set to 0 in cases (1) and (2).
By Proposition 16 there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times 0 < σ1 <
σ2 < σ3 < ... such that: p (cσ1,σ2 = cσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1− δ3 . We assume w.l.o.g. that σ1 > N0.
Let E = Ω\
(
Φ
⋃{
ω ∈ Ω|∃n s.t. cσn,σn+1 (ω) 6= c1,2 (ω)
})
be the event where there are no
approximation errors (as deﬁned in Subsection 4.1) and the color of all ﬁnite trees after
σ1 is the same. Observe that P (E) > 1− 23δ > 1− δ.
4.5 Constant-Expectation Sequential Correlated Equilibrium
We conclude this section by proving Theorem 10: showing that every (non-periodic)
stopping game admits a sequential (δ, )-constant-expectation normal-form correlated
(δ, )-equilibrium with a canonical correlation device. By Lemma 12, Theorem 10 is im-
plied by the following proposition:
Proposition 17 Let E and σ1 be deﬁned as in the previous subsection. There is a canon-
ical correlation device D = (M,µ), and a subset M ′ ⊆M satisfying µ (M ′) > 1− δ, such
that for every m ∈M ′ and every ω ∈ E, there is a sequential 2-constant-expectation 2-
equilibrium conditioned on E andM ′, xH , in the game G(H,D,m), where H = Hσ1(ω) (ω).
PROOF. Let c = cσ1,σ2 (ω)=(case, w, g) be the color of the game Gσ1(ω),σ2 (H). Solan and
Shmaya (2004) investigated 2-player stopping games, when case is equal either to 1 or 2
(case 3 is only relevant to games with more than two players). They show that one can
concatenate the sequential stationary Nash /11-equilibria of each approximating game on
a tree Tσk(ω),σk+1
(
Hσk(ω) (ω)
)
into a sequential -equilibrium (conditioned on E), xH , in
the induced game without pre-play correlation G(H). The proﬁle xH naturally induces a
sequential -constant-expectation -equilibrium conditioned on E and M ′ in G(H,D,m),
given any correlation device D and any signal proﬁle m.
For this concatenation to work when case = 1, Solan and Shmaya (2004) provided
appropriate minimal bounds to the probability of termination in the ﬁrst round of the
stationary approximate equilibrium of each game on a tree Tσk(ω),σk+1
(
Hσk(ω) (ω)
)
, that
guarantee that the concatenated proﬁle, xH , is absorbed with probability 1. With minor
adaptations, Shmaya and Solan (2004, Section 5)'s method works also in multi-player
stopping games, as described in Appendix B.
Thus, we only have to deal with the third case (case = 3). The construction in this case
is an adaptation of the procedure of Solan and Vohra (2002), which deals with quitting
games (stationary stopping games where the payoﬀ is the same at all stages). Changes
with respect to the original procedure are needed to guarantee constant-expectation and
sequentiality (which are not satisﬁed in Solan and Vohra, 2002).
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For each player i ∈ I, let v˜i be a node in the tree Tσ1,σ2
(
Hσ1(ω) (ω)
)
that gives player
i his maximal reward when stopping alone - gi. The deﬁnition of D (H) (the set of payoﬀ
matrices that repeats inﬁnitely often in H) and αi (H) (the maximal single-stopper payoﬀ
in D (H) - see Subsection 4.1), implies that gi = αi (H), and that Rv˜i ∈ D (H) (the payoﬀ
matrix of each node v˜i repeats inﬁnitely often in the non-periodic inﬁnite stopping game,
assuming that ω ∈ E). Let ζ be the distribution over the players that satisﬁes (Proposition
14): 3-a)
∑
i∈I ζ (i) · Rj{i},v˜i ≥ gj , and 3-b) for each player i there is a punisher - a player
ji such that g
i ≥ Ri{ji},v˜ji .
Let (τ ik)i∈I, n≥1 be an increasing sequence of stopping times deﬁned by induction: τ
i
1 is
the ﬁrst stage m in which payoﬀ matrix Rv˜i is reached - Rm (ω) = Rv˜i ; and τ
i
n+1 is the
ﬁrst stage m > max
j∈I
(τ jn) such that Rm (ω) = Rv˜i . Observe that in E each τ
i
n is bounded
(because all the payoﬀ matrices (Rv˜i)i∈I repeat inﬁnitely often). Let τn = maxi∈I
(τ in). Intu-
itively, the stopping times (τn)n≥1 divide the inﬁnite (non-periodic) stopping game into
rounds. In each such round (assuming ω ∈ E), the game passes at least once through each
of the payoﬀ matrices Rv˜i .
We now describe an auxiliary correlation device Dζ . The device chooses a player to
stop (the stopper) according to the distribution ζ. Let T ∈ N be chosen suﬃciently large,
and let Tˆ ∈ N be chosen to be much greater than T . The alphabet of the correlation
device includes Tˆ + T + 1 integers: ∀i ∈ I, M iD(H) = {1, ..., Tˆ + T + 1}.
The signal sent to each player i is interpreted as the round in which that player should
stop with probability 1− when reaching payoﬀ matrix Rv˜i for the ﬁrst time in that round.
The stopper receives a signal lˆ from the uniform distribution on the integers between 1
and Tˆ . The punisher receives signal l from the uniform distribution on the integers from
lˆ + 1 to lˆ + T . Finally, all other player receive the signal l + 1. If the game has passed
through Tˆ + T + 1 rounds, then the game returns to round 1. Formally, each player i
with signal mi ∈ {1, ..., Tˆ + T + 1} stops with probability 1- at the ﬁrst time that payoﬀ
matrix d (i) is reached at each round n that satisﬁes n = (mi) mod
(
Tˆ + T + 1
)
.
This mechanism ensures that upon receiving the signal, with a large probability any
player's estimate of the probability that he has been chosen as the stopper (the Bayesian
posterior probability) is virtually unchanged from the prior probability. Formally, we
require that with probability 1− δ
2|D| the posterior probabilities of all players are changed
by at most . Also, if the stopper deviates, the probability of him correctly predicting
the moment of punishment is very small. Hence, given the others follow their signals, the
stopper has no incentive to deviate. If the game is not stopped by the stopper, then at
the time at which the punisher is supposed to stop, he believes with high probability that
he is the stopper and so should stop according to the argument above.
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Let (ζk)1≤k≤K be an -dense subset of the compact set of distributions 4 (I): for each
ζ ∈ 4 (I), there is k such that maxi∈I |ζ (i)− ζk (i)| < . Let the canonical correlation
device D = (M,µ), which only depends on |I| and , be the Cartesian multiplication of the
correlation devices Dζk for each k: D =
∏
1≤k≤K Dζk . To each player i the universal device
D sends a vector of numbers (recommendations) (mik)1≤k≤K . When the bounded time σ1 is
reached, each player chooses the smallest k such ‖ζk − ζ‖∞ ≤ , where ζ is the distribution
over the players in the periodic game Tσ1,σ2
(
Hσ1(ω) (ω)
)
(as deﬁned in Proposition 14),
and he follows the recommendation mik (as described above). Let M
′ ⊆ M be the set of
signals such that for every player the posterior probability of being chosen as the stopper
by the devices (Dζk)1≤k≤K are changed by at most . The above arguments imply that
µ (M ′) > 1 − δ, and that the obedient strategy is a sequential 2-constant-expectation
2-equilibrium in the game G(H,D,m) conditioned on E and M ′. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 17. 
Remark 18 In our construction players are asked to stop with probability 1 − . This
implies that no history is ever oﬀ the equilibrium path, and thus every equilibrium is
sequential. It is possible to construct a similar equilibrium in which players are asked to
stop with probability 1, by carefully deﬁning players' beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path.
We conclude by demonstrating the use of our procedure in a simple example.
Example 19 Consider the following periodic stopping game with 3 players. At stages
3k + 1 (resp., 3k + 2, 3k + 3) If player 1 (resp., player 2, player 3) stops alone the payoﬀ
vector is (1, 0, 5) (resp., (5, 1, 0), (0, 5, 1)). If players 1 and 2 (resp., players 2 and 3, players
3 and 1) stop together, the payoﬀ is (0, 2, 0) (resp., (0, 0, 2), (2, 0, 0)). If any other non-
empty set of players stop, the payoﬀ vector is (0, 0, 0). That is, at each stage 3k+ i player
i gets 1 if he stops alone, and this yields 0 for player (i+ 1) mod 3 and 5 for player
(i+ 2) mod 3. If Player (i+ 1) mod 3 stops as well, he gets 2, while the other players get
0. Observe, that each player can get a maximal payoﬀ of 1 by stopping alone (g = (1, 1, 1)),
and that each player i has a punisher ji = (i+ 2) mod 3.
In what follows we demonstrate how our procedure induces the payoﬀ (2, 2, 2) =
1
3
(1, 0, 5)+ 1
3
(5, 1, 0)+ 1
3
(0, 5, 1) as an approximate constant-expectation sequential equilib-
rium. In this example, the sequence of stopping times (τ in) is as follows: τ
i
n = 3 ·(n− 1)+i.
This sequence divides the game into rounds of length 3: round 1 includes stages 1-3, round
2 includes stages 4-6, etc.
Say, for example, that the device chose player 1 as the stopper. Then player 1 receives
signal m1 = lˆ, his punisher, player 3, receives signal m3 = lˆ + l, and player 2 receives
signal m2 = lˆ + l + 1. Assuming that the players follow their signals, player 1 stops with
probability 1 −  when his optimal payoﬀ (as a single stopper) is realized in the m1-th
round (that is, at stage τ 1m1 = 3 · (m1 − 1) + 1); player 3 (resp., player 2) stops with
probability 1−  when his optimal payoﬀ is realized in round m3-th (resp., round m2-th)
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round (if the game has not terminated earlier); player 1 stops with probability 1−  when
his optimal payoﬀ is realized in the m1 +
(
Tˆ + T + 1
)
-th round, etc.
5 Extensions
Our formal model only dealt with simple stopping games, which end as soon as
any player stops. We now discuss how to extend our result to more generalized strategic
interactions, such as the leading example.
A generalized stopping game is played as follows. There is an unknown state variable,
on which players receive symmetric partial information during play. For each player i,
there is a ﬁnite number, Ti, that limits the number of actions he may take during the
game. At each stage, each player i has a ﬁnite set of stopping actions Ai. At stage 1 all
the players are active. At every stage n, each active player declares, independently of the
others, whether he takes one of the stopping actions in Ai or continues. A player that
has stopped Ti times, becomes passive for the rest of the game and must choose continue
in all subsequent stages. The payoﬀ of a player depends on the history of actions and on
the state variable.
A generalized stopping game is diﬀerent from a simple stopping game in three as-
pects: (1) if no player ever stops the payoﬀ is not necessarily zero; (2) each player has
a few diﬀerent stopping actions (|Ai| > 1); (3) each player may act a ﬁnite number of
times (Ti > 1) until he becomes passive, and when he becomes passive, the game continues
with the other players.
Proposition 14 also holds when each player has a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent stopping
actions, and when the payoﬀ if no player ever stops is diﬀerent from zero. Thus, with
minor adaptations, our proof is extended to cases (1) and (2).
The third case, where each player may act a ﬁnite number of times, is handled by
using backward induction. The details are standard, and we only sketch here the main
idea. Let m =
∑
i Ti be the total number of times the players are allowed to stop. Assume
by induction on m, that any generalized stopping game where players can stop at most n
times, admits an equilibrium of our type (sequential normal-form correlated approximate
equilibrium with a canonical correlation device). Given a generalized stopping game G′
with m stops, we construct an auxiliary stopping game G with the following payoﬀ
process: RiS,n is equal to the payoﬀ of player i in an equilibrium of our type of induced
generalized stopping game with total number of stops n− |S| that begins at stage n+ 1,
where the Ti of each player i in S is reduced by one. Such an equilibrium exists due to
the induction hypothesis. By Theorem 10, the auxiliary game G admits an equilibrium of
our type x. x induces an equilibrium of our type x′ in the original game G′ in a natural
way: players follow x as long as all the players continue; as soon as some of the players
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stop, the remaining active players play the equilibrium of the induced stopping game with
fewer stops.
Our result can also be extended to stopping games with voting procedures (see, e.g.,
Kurano, Yasuda and Nakagami, 1980, Yasuda, Nakagami and Kurano, 1982, and Sza-
jowski and Yasuda, 1997). In such games, each player votes at each stage whether or not
he wishes to stop the game, and there is some monotonic rule (for example, a majority
rule) that determines whether the game stops or continues. Observe that unlike the above
existing literature, we allow the payoﬀ process to depend on the identity of the stopping
players. The adaptation of our proof to this more general setup involves a single (non-
minor) change: the absorbing game that is equivalent to a stopping game on a ﬁnite tree
(Subsection 4.3) does no longer have a unique non-absorbing action proﬁle. Nevertheless,
Proposition 4.10 of Solan and Vohra (2002) can still be used (but in a more generalized
way than Proposition 14, which assumes a unique non-absorbing proﬁle), and an adapta-
tion of the public signaling methods of Solan and Vohra allows to extend our result, and
prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium of our type.
A Constant-Expectation Correlated Equilibrium
Sorin (1998) presented the notion of distribution equilibrium for ﬁnite normal-form
games as a correlated equilibrium in which the expected payoﬀ of each agent is inde-
pendent of his signal. In Section 2 we generalized this notion for dynamic games with
normal-form correlation, and called it constant-expectation correlated equilibrium. In this
section we present basic properties of these notions, and discuss their rationales. Some
of these properties were described in Sorin (1998), and are given for completeness (Sorin
(1998) is an unpublished manuscript, which is not readily available).
A.1 Properties and Examples
We brieﬂy discuss some of the properties of distribution equilibrium in normal-form
games. First, every Nash equilibrium is a distribution equilibrium. Second, unlike the set
of correlated equilibria, the set of distribution equilibria is not convex, as demonstrated
in the battle of the sexes game illustrated in Table A.2: both (T,R) and (B,L) are
distribution equilibria, but [0.5 (T,R) , 0.5 (B,L)] is not (the payoﬀ of a player is either 1
or 2, depending on his signal).
The next example (Table A.2, adapted from Moulin and Vial, 1978) demonstrates
that distribution equilibrium can induce payoﬀs that dominate the payoﬀs of Nash equi-
libria. The left table describes the payoﬀ matrix. In this example, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in which each player plays (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) with payoﬀ 4/3. The symmetric
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Table A.1
Battle of the Sexes - a Normal-Form Two-Player Game
L R
T (0, 0) (2, 1)
B (1, 2) (0, 0)
Table A.2
Two-player Game with a Nash-Dominating Distribution Equilibrium
2-Player Game
A B C
A (0, 0) (1, 3) (3, 1)
B (3, 1) (0, 0) (1, 3)
C (1, 3) (3, 1) (0, 0)
Distribution Equilibrium
A B C
A 0 1/6 1/6
B 1/6 0 1/6
C 1/6 1/6 0
Table A.3
Chicken Game: Best Distribution and Correlated Equilibria
Chicken Game
C D
C (6, 6) (2, 7)
D (7, 2) (0, 0)
Best Symmetric Distribution Eq.
C D
C 4/9 2/9
D 2/9 1/9
Correlated Equilibrium
C D
C 1/2 1/4
D 1/4 0
distribution equilibrium, which is described in the right table, induces payoﬀ 2, and it
dominates the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ.
Finally, Table A.3 (left table) presents the Chicken game (see, Aumann, 1974). The
best symmetric distribution equilibrium in this game is the Nash equilibrium that induces
payoﬀ 42
3
(in which each player plays C with probability 2/3 and D with probability 1/3
as described in the middle table). The right table presents a symmetric non-distribution
correlated equilibrium that yields an unconditional expected payoﬀ 42
3
to a player who has
received a signal of C and a guaranteed payoﬀ of 7 to a player who has received a signal of
D. Hence a player who has received the second-best signal is still at least as well oﬀ as he
would be under the distribution equilibrium, and moreover, there is a 2/3 probability that
his payoﬀ will be the same as that of his opponent. Because the correlated equilibrium
weakly dominates the distribution equilibrium both prior and posterior to the signal, and
because a player receiving the second-best signal cannot be sure that his opponent is any
better oﬀ, the constant-expectation property is not compelling here. However, there are
situations in which the property appears more natural, as illustrated in the following two
subsections.
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A.2 Population Games
A common interpretation of Nash equilibrium is that it describes the behavior of
populations of agents who are randomly matched to play that game (see, e.g., Aumann,
1997). If each agent faces the same pattern of matching opponents, then an equilibrium in
which each agent chooses a best reply corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the underlying
game. Maliath, Samuelson and Shaked (1997) relax the assumption of uniform matching
pattern. They allow diﬀerent types in the population to be matched to diﬀerent opponents.
In such a setup, an equilibrium in which each agent chooses a best reply (given his type's
pattern of matching opponents) is a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game.
Sorin (1998) changes the framework of Maliath, Samuelson and Shaked by allowing
a deviating agent to imitate the matching pattern of another type: agent of type i is
allowed to join the sub-population of type j and to follow their matching behavior. In such
a setup, an equilibrium in which each agent chooses a best pattern among the existing
matching patterns, and a best reply given this pattern is a distribution equilibrium.
Non-distribution correlated equilibria are not stable in Sorin's setup. Consider, for
example, the best symmetric correlated equilibrium in the Chicken game (Table A.3).
The population includes two types: a d  type (1
4
of the population) who is matched only
to c opponents and always plays D, and a c type (3
4
of the population) who is matched
to c opponents with probability 2
3
and is matched to d  opponents with probability 1
3
,
and always plays C. If agents of one type are allowed to imitate the matching behavior
of another type, then agents of type c (with payoﬀ 42
3
) would deviate and imitate the
matching and playing behavior of type d , which has payoﬀ 7.
In addition, non-distribution correlated equilibria are not stable in an evolutionary
setup in which the type is determined at birth, and the payoﬀ describes the ﬁtness of each
type. In such a setup, a type that has higher expected payoﬀ will have higher number
of oﬀspring, and therefore his share of the population will increase. For example, in the
Chicken game, the population's share of type d  would become larger than 1
4
in the
following generations.
A.3 Weak Mediators
One of the interpretations of a correlation device is a mediator. A mediator is a trusted
third party that chooses an action proﬁle according to a known (correlated) probability
distribution, and privately informs each player of his part of the proﬁle (a recommended
action). The probability distribution is a correlated equilibrium if it is best-reply for
each player to follow his recommended action, given that all other players follow their
recommended actions.
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In some situations, mediators are weak in the sense that a player who receives a bad
recommended action (which induces a low expected payoﬀ) has the ability to restart the
mediation process. Some examples for such situations are:
• A married couple (say, Alice and Bob) goes to a marriage counselor. If Alice is dis-
content from the recommendations the counselor gave her, she may ask Bob to go to
another counselor. It is plausible that Bob would agree to this request, which restarts
the mediation process.
• Two countries in dispute ask a powerful third country to suggest an outline for a peace
conference. Such an outline may include conﬁdential parts, such as a monetary aid
given to one side for his agreement to participate in the conference. The third country
conﬁdentially informs each disputing country on its part of the outline. Each disputing
country can refuse the suggested outline. In that case, the outline is canceled and the
disputing countries go back to the starting position, and they may restart the peace
initiative with a new mediator.
In such situations, distribution equilibria have an important advantage: they can be im-
plemented by weak mediators without having any player wishing to restart the mediation
process. On the other hand, the implementation of non-distribution correlated equilibrium
is limited by players' ability to restart the mediation. The concept of weak mediators, and
its relation with pre-play communication, is more thoroughly discussed in Heller (2010b).
A.4 Dynamic Games with Normal-Form Correlation
The above rationales, presented for distribution equilibria in normal-form games, are
also appropriate to our notion of constant-expectation correlated equilibria in dynamic
games with normal-form correlation. In the spirit of these rationales, our deﬁnition requires
that the payoﬀ of each player is independent of the signal before the game starts, when it
is still possible to restart the pre-play process that induces the correlated proﬁle. Observe,
that we allow that later in the game, after some signals are received (e.g., the realization
of the payoﬀ matrices in a stopping games), a player may ﬁnd out that his expected
continuation payoﬀ has changed, and is diﬀerent than his original expected payoﬀ.
B Technical Details
In Section 4 we presented a simpliﬁed version of the coloring scheme that is used in
the construction of the concatenated equilibrium. In this appendix we present the exact
coloring scheme, and show how to adapt Solan and Shmaya (2004)'s methods to give
appropriate lower bounds for the termination probabilities in case (1) of Proposition 14.
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B.1 Limits on Per-Round Probability of Termination
In this subsection we bound the probability of termination in a single round of a game
on a tree when an absorbing stationary equilibrium x exists (case (1) of Prop. 14), by
adapting the methods presented in Shmaya and Solan (2004, Section 5) for two players.
A stationary strategy of player i in a game on a tree T is a function xi : V0 → [0, 1]
(recall that V0 = V \Vleaf is the set of nodes that are not leaves; xi(v) is the probability that
player 1 stops at v. Let ci be the strategy of player i that never stops, and let c = (ci)i∈I .
Given a stationary strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I , let γ
i(x) = γiT (x) be the expected payoﬀ
under x, and let pi(x) = piT (x) be the probability that the game is stopped at the ﬁrst
round (before returning to the root). Assuming no player ever stops, the collection (pv)v∈V0
of probability distributions at the nodes induces a probability distribution over the set of
leaves or, equivalently, over the set of paths that connect the root to the leaves. For each
set Vˆ ⊆ V0, we denote by pVˆ the probability that the path reached passes through Vˆ . For
each v ∈ V , we denote by Fv the event that the path reached passes through v.
The following lemma bounds the probability of termination in a single round when the
-equilibrium payoﬀ is low for at least one player. The lemma is an adaptation of Lemma
5.3 in Shmaya and Solan (2004), and the proof is omitted as the changes are minor.
Lemma 20 Let G be a stopping game, n > 0, σ > n a bounded stopping time, H ∈ Hn
a history, and x an absorbing stationary 
2
-equilibrium in Tn,σ(Hn) such that there exists
a player i with a low payoﬀ: γi(x) ≤ αiH − . Then pi(ci, x−i) ≥ 6 · qi, where qi = qiT =
p
(⋃
v∈Vstop
{
Fv|Ri{i},v = αiH
})
is the probability that if no player ever stop, the game visits
a node v ∈ V0 with Ri{i},v = αiH in the ﬁrst round.
T ′ is a subgame of T if we remove all the descendants (in the strict sense) of several nodes
from the tree
(
V, Vleaf , r, (Cv)v∈V0
)
and keep all other parameters ﬁxed. Observe that this
notion is diﬀerent from the standard deﬁnition of a subgame in game theory. Formally:
Deﬁnition 21 Let T =
(
I, V, Vleaf , r, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
and let T ′ =(
I , V ′, V ′leaf , r
′, (C ′v, p
′
v, R
′
v)v∈V ′0
)
be two games on trees. We say that T ′ is a subgame of T
if: V ′ ⊆ V , r′ = r, and for every v ∈ V ′0 , C ′v = Cv, p′v = pv and R′v = Rv.
Let T be a game on a tree. For each subset D ⊆ V0, we denote by TD the subgame of
T generated by trimming T from D downward. Thus, all descendants of nodes in D are
removed. For every subgame T ′ of T and every subgame T ′′ of T ′, let pT ′′,T ′ = pV ′′
leaf
,V ′
leaf
be the probability that the chosen branch in T passes through a leaf of T ′′ strictly before
it passes through a leaf of T ′.
The following deﬁnition divides the histories Hn into two kinds: simple and com-
plicated. A simple history has at least one of the following properties: (1) Every player
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receives a negative payoﬀ whenever he stops alone. (2) There is a distribution over the set
of action proﬁles in which a single player stops, such that each player receives payoﬀ αiH
when he stops, and approximately this is also his average payoﬀ when other players stop.
Deﬁnition 22 Let G be a stopping game,  > 0, N0 ≤ n, and τ > n a bounded stopping
time. The history H ∈ Hn is -simple if one of the following holds:
(1) For every i ∈ I: αiH < 0. or
(2) There is a distribution θ ∈ ∆(DH × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
(a) θ(d, i) > 0⇒ Ri{i},d = αiH . and
(b) αiH +  ≥
∑
j∈I, d∈DH
θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiH − .
H is simple if it is -simple for every  > 0. H is complicated if it is not simple, i.e.:
∃0 > 0 such that H is not 0-simple. In that case we say that H is complicated w.r.t. 0.
The next proposition analyzes stationary −equilibria that yield high payoﬀs to all the
players. The proposition is an adaptation of Proposition 5.5 in Shmaya and Solan (2004).
The proof is omitted as the changes are minor.
Proposition 23 Let G be a stopping game, N0 ≤ n a number, σ > n a bounded stopping
time, H ∈ Hn a complicated history w.r.t. 0,  << 0|I|·|D| , and for each i ∈ I let
ai ≥ αiF − . Then there exists a set U ⊆ V0 and a proﬁle x in T = Tn,σ(F ) such that:
(1) No subgame of TU has a Nash -equilibrium with a corresponding payoﬀ in
∏
i∈I
[ai, ai + ];
(2) Either: (a) U = ∅ (so that TU = T ); or (b) x is a Nash 9-equilibrium in T, and
for every i ∈ I and for every strategy yi: ai −  ≤ γi(x), γi(x−i, yi) ≤ ai + 8, and
pi(x) ≥ 2 · pTU ,T .
B.2 Detailed Description of The Coloring Scheme
In Subsection 4.4 we presented a simpliﬁed version of the coloring scheme that is used
in the proof of Proposition 17. In this subsection, we present the details of the exact
coloring scheme, which adapts the coloring scheme for two-player games in Shmaya-Solan
(2004). Speciﬁcally, we provide an algorithm that attaches a color cn,σ(H) and several
numbers (λj,n,σ(H))j for every σ > n ≥ 0 and H ∈ Hn, such that cn,σ(H) is a C -valued
F-consistent NT -function.
A (hyper)-rectangle ([ai, ai + ])i∈I is bad if for every i ∈ I, αiH −  ≤ ai. It is good if
there exists a player i ∈ I such that ai+ ≤ αiH−. LetW be a ﬁnite covering of [−1, 1]|I|
with (not necessarily disjoint) rectangles ([ai, ai + ])i∈I , all of which are either good or
bad. Let B = {b1, b2, ..., bJ} be the set of J bad rectangles inW and let O = {o1, o2, ..., oK}
the set of good rectangles.
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Set C = (simple
⋃
allbad
⋃ {1×O}⋃ {2}⋃ {3×W ×W}). LetG be a stopping game,
n ≥ 0, σ > n a bounded stopping time, and H ∈ Hn. If H is simple we let cn,σ(H) =
simple. Otherwise, H is complicated w.r.t. to some 0(H). In that case we assume w.l.o.g.
that  << 0(H)|I|·|D| . The color cn,σ(H) is determined by the following procedure:
• Set T (0) = Tn,σ(H).
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ J apply Proposition 14 to T (j−1) and the bad rectangle hj = ∏
i∈I
[
aij, a
i
j + 
]
to obtain a subgame T (j) of T (j−1) and strategy proﬁle xj in T (j) such that:
(1) No subgame of T (j) has a stationary -equilibrium with a corresponding payoﬀ in hj.
(2) Either T (j) = T (j−1) or the following three conditions hold:
(a) For every i ∈ I, aij −  ≤ γi(xj).
(b) For every i ∈ I and every strategy yi: γi(x−ij , yi) ≤ aij + 8.
(c) pi (xj) ≥ 2 × pT (j),T (j−1) .
• If T (J) is trivial (the only node is the root), set cn,σ(H) = allbad; otherwise due to
Proposition 14 and our procedure one of the following holds:
(1) T (J) has a sequential stationary absorbing -equilibrium x, with a payoﬀ γ(x) in one
of the good hyper-rectangles. Let cn,σ(H) = (1, ol), where ol is the good rectangle
that includes γx .
(2) T (J) has a sequential stationary non-absorbing equilibrium c, with a payoﬀ 0. Let
cn,σ(H) = (2).
(3) There is a correlated strategy proﬁle η ∈ ∆(A) in T (J) that satisﬁes 3(a)+3(b)+3(c)
in Proposition 14. Let cn,σ(H) = (3, w1, w2) where w1 is the hyper-rectangle that
includes γT (J)(η), and w2 is the hyper-rectangle that includes g(T
(J)).
Each strategy proﬁle xj, as given by Proposition 14, is a proﬁle in T
(j−1). We consider it
as a proﬁle in T by letting it continue from the leaves of T (j−1) downward. We deﬁne, for
every j ∈ J , λj,n,σ(F ) = pT (j),T (j−1) . By Proposition 16 there exists an increasing sequence
of bounded stopping times 0 < σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < ... such that p (cσ1,σ2 = cσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1− δ3 .
For every ω ∈ Ω and H = H (ω) ∈ Hσ1(ω), let cH = cσ1,σ2(H).
Let (A,j, A∞,j)j∈J ∈
∨
n=1..∞
Fn be deﬁned as follows:
A∞,j =
{
w ∈ Ω| ∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Hσk(ω) (ω)
)
=∞
}
is the event where the sum of the λ-s is inﬁnite, and
A,j =
{
w ∈ Ω| ∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Fσk(ω)
)
≤ |J |
}
is the event where the sum is very small. As (A,j, A∞,j)j∈J ∈
∨
n=1..∞
Fn, there is large
enough N1 ≥ N0 and sets
(
A¯,j, A¯∞,j
)
j∈J ∈ FN1 that approximate A∞,j and A,j: (1)
For each j ∈ J , A¯,j ⋂ A¯∞,j = ∅ and(A¯,j ⋃ A¯∞,j) = Ω. (2) p (A,j|A¯,j) ≥ 1 − δ6·|J | . (3)
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p
(
A∞,j|A¯∞,j
)
≥ 1 − δ
6·|J | . From now on, we assume w.l.o.g. that σ1 ≥ N1. Let E ′ be
deﬁned as follows (Observe that p(E ′) ≥ 1− δ):
E ′=E\
⋃
j∈J
{
ω ∈ A¯,j|
∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Hσk(ω) (ω)
)
>

|J |
}
⋃
j∈J
{
ω ∈ A¯∞,j|
∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Hσk(ω) (ω)
)
<∞
} .
That is, E ′ is equal to E (deﬁned in Subsection 4.4), except that we subtract the errors
in the approximations of (A,j, A∞,j)j∈J by
(
A¯,j
⋃
A¯∞,j
)
j∈J .
B.3 Detailed Proof of Cases 1 and 2 of Proposition 17
In Subsection 4.5 we gave the details of the proof of Proposition 17 only when case = 3.
In this subsection we give the details of the proof for the other cases, which are adaptations
of the proof for the two-player case in Shmaya and Solan (2004). The proof is divided to
5 exhaustive cases according to the color of cH and whether H ∩ A¯∞,j 6= ∅.
B.3.1 There exists j ∈ J and F ∈ H such that F ⊆ A¯∞,j
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ J be the smallest index such that F ⊆ A¯∞,j. Let xj,σk,σk+1 be the jth
proﬁle in the procedure described earlier, when applied to Tσk,σk+1 (H). Let xH be the
following strategy proﬁle in G (H,D,m): between σk and σk+1 play according to xj,σk,σk+1 .
The procedure of the previous subsection implies the following:
• Conditioned on that the game was absorbed between σk and σk+1 the proﬁle xj,σk,σk+1
gives each player a payoﬀ: aij −  ≤ γiσk,σk+1(xj) ≤ aij + 8.
• For each player i ∈ I and for each strategy yi in Tσk,σk+1 : (1) γiσk,σk+1(x−ij , yi) ≤ aij + 8.
(2) piσk,σk+1(xj) ≥ 2 × λj(Tσk,σk+1)
These facts imply that the game is absorbed with probability 1 in E ′, and that xF is a
11-equilibrium conditioned on E ′ . Observe that cH = allbed implies that there exists
j ∈ J and F ∈ H such that F ∈ A¯∞,j.
B.3.2 There exists F ∈ H such that F ⊆
(
∩
j∈J
A¯,j
)
and cH = 2 :
Let xH be the proﬁle in which everyone continues. It is implied that no player can
proﬁt more than  by deviating at any stage, conditioned on E ′.
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B.3.3 There exists F ∈ H such that F ⊆
(
∩
j∈J
A¯,j
)
and cH = (1, ok) ∈ (1×O)
Let xσk,σk+1 be a stationary absorbing equilibrium in T
(J) with a payoﬀ γσk,σk+1 in the
good hyper-rectangle ow:
∏
i∈I [aiw, a
i
w + ]. As ow is good, there is a player i ∈ I such
that: aiw ≤ αiH − 2. Let xH be the following strategy proﬁle in GH : between σk and
σk+1 play according to xσk,σk+1 . Lemma 20 implies that pi(c
i, x−iσk,σk+1) ≥ 6 · qiσk,σk+1 , where
qiσk,σk+1 = p(∃σk ≤ n < σk+1, Rii,n = αiF , Rii,n ∈ DF ). In E ′, Rii,n = αiF inﬁnitely often and∑
j=1..J
∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1 < . This implies that under xH the game is absorbed with probability
1, and that xH is a 4-equilibrium in G, conditioned on E
′.
B.3.4 There exists F ∈ H such that F ⊆
(
∩
j∈J
A¯,j
)
and cH = (3, w1, w2) ∈ (1×W ×W )
This case was thoroughly presented in Subsection 4.5.
B.3.5 cH = simple
If for every i ∈ I: αiH ≤ 0, then the proﬁle in which all the players always continue
is an equilibrium in E ′. Otherwise, the fact that cH = simple implies that there is a
distribution θ ∈ ∆(DH × I) such that for each i ∈ I: (1) θ(d, i) > 0 ⇒ Ri{i},d = αiH . (2)
αiH +  ≥
∑
j∈I, d∈DF
θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiH − . In this case, one can use a procedure similar to
the one described in Subsection 4.5, to construct a sequential -equilibrium in G(H,D,m)
conditioned on E ′ and M ′.
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